I. CONCERNING GOD.

• I. CONCERNING GOD. DEFINITIONS.

• I. CONCERNING GOD. AXOIMS.

• I. CONCERNING GOD. PROPOSITIONS.

• • I-I. Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.

  • I-II. Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common.

  • I-III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause of the other.

  • I-IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other

  • I-V. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.

  • I-VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

  • I-VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substances.

  • I-VIII. Every substance is necessarily infinite.

  • I-IX. The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the number of its attributes (Def. iv.).

  • I-X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.

  • I-XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

  • I-XII. No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.

  • I-XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

  • I-XIV. Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

  • I-XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

  • I-XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things

  • I-XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone.

  • I-XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.

  • I-XIX. God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.

  • I-XX. The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.

  • I-XXI. All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God

  • I-XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as

  • I-XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite

  • I-XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

  • I-XXV. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.

  • I-XXVI. A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner

  • I-XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.

  • I-XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence

  • I-XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned

  • I-XXX. Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function infinite

  • I-XXXI. The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love

  • I-XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause.

  • I-XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by God

  • I-XXXIV. God’s power is identical with his essence.

  • I-XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God, necessarily exists.

  • I-XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not follow.

  • I. CONCERNING GOD. APPENDIX.

II. ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND.

• II. ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. PREFACE.

• II. ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. DEFINITIONS.

• II. ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. AXIOMS.

• II. ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. POSTULATES.

• II. ON THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. PROPOSITIONS.

• • II-I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.

  • II-II. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.

  • II-III. In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence

  • II-IV. The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.

  • II-V. The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so far as he is considered

  • II-VI. The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so far as he is considered

  • II-VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

  • II-VIII. The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist

  • II-IX. The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by God

  • II-X. The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man

  • II-XI. The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind

  • II-XII. Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which constitutes the human mind

  • II-XIII. The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body

  • II-XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things

  • II-XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind

  • II-XVI. The idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies

  • II-XVII. If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body

  • II-XVIII. If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time

  • II-XIX. The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist

  • II-XX. The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God

  • II-XXI. This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body.

  • II-XXII. The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.

  • II-XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.

  • II-XXIV. The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body.

  • II-XXV. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.

  • II-XXVI. The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing

  • II-XXVII. The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve

  • II-XXVIII. The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as

  • II-XXIX. The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.

  • II-XXX. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.

  • II-XXXI. We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to ourselves.

  • II-XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true.

  • II-XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false.

  • II-XXXIV. Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect, is true.

  • II-XXXV. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.

  • II-XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity, as adequate

  • II-XXXVII. That which is common to all (cf. Lemma II., above), and which is equally

  • II-XXXVIII. Those things, which are common to all, and which are equally in a part

  • II-XXXIX. That, which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies

  • II-XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.

  • II-XLI. Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity, knowledge of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.

  • II-XLII. Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.

  • II-XLIII. He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived.

  • II-XLIV. It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary.

  • II-XLV. Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.

  • II-XLVI. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which every idea involves is adequate and perfect.

  • II-XLVII. The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

  • II-XLVIII. In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined

  • II-XLIX. There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves.

III. ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS.

• III. ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS. DEFINITIONS.

• III. ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS. POSTULATES.

• III. ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS. PROPOSITIONS.

• • III-I. Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive.

  • III-II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body

  • III-III. The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas

  • III-IV. Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to itself.

  • III-V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same object

  • III-VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being.

  • III-VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question.

  • III-VIII. The endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist in its own being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.

  • III-IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas

  • III-X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.

  • III-XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes

  • III-XII. The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body.

  • III-XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body’s power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible

  • III-XIV. If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of these two

  • III-XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire.

  • III-XVI. Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object

  • III-XVII. If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing

  • III-XVIII. A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by the image of a thing past or future as by the image of a thing present.

  • III-XIX. He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved he will feel pleasure.

  • III-XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will also feel pleasure.

  • III-XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is affected pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurably or painfully

  • III-XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards that thing.

  • III-XXIII. He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure.

  • III-XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also.

  • III-XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and concerning what we love, everything that we can conceive to affect pleasurably ourselves

  • III-XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully

  • III-XXVII. By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion

  • III-XXVIII. We endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure

  • III-XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates anything which we ourselves love, desire, or hate

  • III-XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something, which only one person can possess

  • III-XXXIII. When we love a thing similar to ourselves we endeavour, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in return.

  • III-XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our complacency.

  • III-XXXV. If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to

  • III-XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances

  • III-XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.

  • III-XXXVIII. If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal

  • III-XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself

  • III-XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate that other in return.

  • III-XLI. If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love that other in return.

  • III-XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude.

  • III-XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be destroyed by love.

  • III-XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it.

  • III-XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that person.

  • III-XLVI. If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone, of a class or nation different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain

  • III-XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is destroyed, or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us.

  • III-XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former

  • III-XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, must, other conditions being similar

  • III-L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear.

  • III-LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object.

  • III-LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property

  • III-LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure

  • III-LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity.

  • III-LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat.

  • III-LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations of spirit

  • III-LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of the one individual

  • III-LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire

  • III-LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or desire.

  • III. ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS. DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS.

  • III. ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS. GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS.

IV. Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions.

• IV. Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions. PREFACE.

• IV. Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions. DEFINITIONS.

• IV. Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions. AXIOM.

• IV. Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions. PROPOSITIONS.

• • IV-I. No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true.

  • IV-II. We are only passive, in so far as we are apart of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.

  • IV-III. The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.

  • IV-IV. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes

  • IV-V. The power and increase of every passion, and its persistence in existing are not defined by the power

  • IV-VI. The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the rest of a man’s activities or power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him.

  • IV-VII. An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for controlling emotion.

  • IV-VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof.

  • IV-An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us.

  • IV-X. Towards something future, which we conceive as close at hand, we are affected more intensely

  • IV-XI. An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary is, when other conditions are equal

  • IV-XII. An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist at the present time

  • IV-XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know not to exist in the present

  • IV-XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion.

  • IV-XV. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can be quenched or checked

  • IV-XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future

  • IV-XVII. Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned

  • IV-XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, other conditions being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.

  • IV-XIX. Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.

  • IV-XX. The more every man endeavours, and is able to seek what is useful to him—in other words

  • IV-XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and to live rightly

  • IV-XXII. No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavour to preserve one’s own being.

  • IV-XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular action because he has inadequate ideas

  • IV-XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us the same thing as to act

  • IV-XXV. No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of anything else.

  • IV-XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing further than to understand

  • IV-XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save such things as really conduce to understanding

  • IV-XXVIII. The mind’s highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind’s highest virtue is to know God.

  • IV-XXIX. No individual thing, which is entirely different from our own nature

  • IV-XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature

  • IV-XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good.

  • IV-XXXII. In so far as men are a prey to passion, they cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.

  • IV-XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are assailed by those emotions, which are passions

  • IV-XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions, they can be contrary one to another.

  • IV-XXXV. In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always necessarily agree in nature.

  • IV-XXXVI. The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.

  • IV-XXXVII. The good which every man, who follows after virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men

  • IV-XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways

  • IV-XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest

  • IV-XL. Whatsoever conduces to man’s social life, or causes men to live together in harmony, is useful

  • IV-XLI. Pleasure in itself is not bad but good: contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.

  • IV-XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good; contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.

  • IV-XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is bad.

  • IV-XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive.

  • IV-XLV. Hatred can never be good.

  • IV-XLVI. He, who lives under the guidance of reason, endeavours, as far as possible

  • IV-XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good.

  • IV-XLVIII. The emotions of over—esteem and disparagement are always bad.

  • IV-XLIX. Over—esteem is apt to render its object proud.

  • IV-L. Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, is in itself bad and useless.

  • IV-LI. Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree therewith and arise therefrom.

  • IV-LII. Self—approval may arise from reason, and that which arises from reason is the highest possible.

  • IV-LIII. Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason.

  • IV-LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm.

  • IV-LV. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of self.

  • IV-LVI. Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.

  • IV-LVII. The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites, but hates the company of the high—minded.

  • IV-LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may arise therefrom.

  • IV-LIX. To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive

  • IV-LX. Desire arising from a pleasure or pain, that is not attributable to the whole body

  • IV-LXI. Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.

  • IV-LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates of reason

  • IV-LXIII. He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

  • IV-LXIV. The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.

  • IV-LXV. Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.

  • IV-LXVI. We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present

  • IV-LXVII. A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.

  • IV-LXVIII. If men were born free, they would, so long as they remained free, form no conception of good and evil.

  • IV-LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.

  • IV-LXX. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them.

  • IV-LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another.

  • IV-LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in good faith.

  • IV-LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law

  • IV. Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions. APPENDIX.

V. Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom.

• V. Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom. PREFACE.

• V. Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom. AXIOMS.

• V. Of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom. PROPOSITIONS.

• • V-I. Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind

  • V-II. If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause

  • V-III. An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.

  • V-IV. There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

  • V-V. An emotion towards a thing, which we conceive simply

  • V-VI. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary.

  • V-VII. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take account of time

  • V-VIII. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.

  • V-

  • V-X. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature

  • V-XI. In proportion as a mental image is referred to more objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and occupies the mind more.

  • V-XII. The mental images of things are more easily associated with the images referred to things

  • V-XIII. A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as it is associated with a greater number of other images.

  • V-XIV. The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of God.

  • V-XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God

  • V-XVI. This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind.

  • V-XVII. God is without passions, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

  • V-XVIII. No one can hate God.

  • V-XIX. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should love him in return.

  • V-XX. This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy

  • V-XXI. The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what is past, while the body endures.

  • V-XXII. Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea, which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity.

  • V-XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.

  • V-XXIV. The more we understand particular things, the more do we understand God.

  • V-XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

  • V-XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge

  • V-XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence.

  • V-XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge.

  • V-XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity

  • V-XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity

  • V-XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

  • V-XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause.

  • V-XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

  • V-XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions.

  • V-XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

  • V-XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself

  • V-XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away.

  • V-XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge

  • V-XXXIX. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal.

  • V-XL. In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive

  • V-XLI. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still

  • V-XLII. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself;