How do those who regard the self regard it? They regard feeling as self: ‘Feeling is my self.’ Or they regard it like this: ‘Feeling is definitely not my self. My self does not experience feeling.’ Or they regard it like this: ‘Feeling is definitely not my self. But it’s not that my self does not experience feeling. My self feels, for my self is liable to feel.’

Now, as to those who say: ‘Feeling is my self.’ You should say this to them: ‘Reverend, there are three feelings: pleasant, painful, and neutral. Which one of these do you regard as self?’ Ānanda, at a time when you feel a pleasant feeling, you don’t feel a painful or neutral feeling; you only feel a pleasant feeling. At a time when you feel a painful feeling, you don’t feel a pleasant or neutral feeling; you only feel a painful feeling. At a time when you feel a neutral feeling, you don’t feel a pleasant or painful feeling; you only feel a neutral feeling.

Pleasant feelings, painful feelings, and neutral feelings are all impermanent, conditioned, dependently originated, liable to end, vanish, fade away, and cease. When feeling a pleasant feeling they think: ‘This is my self.’ When their pleasant feeling ceases they think: ‘My self has disappeared.’ When feeling a painful feeling they think: ‘This is my self.’ When their painful feeling ceases they think: ‘My self has disappeared.’ When feeling a neutral feeling they think: ‘This is my self.’ When their neutral feeling ceases they think: ‘My self has disappeared.’ So those who say ‘feeling is my self’ regard as self that which is evidently impermanent, a mixture of pleasure and pain, and liable to rise and fall. That’s why it’s not acceptable to regard feeling as self.

Now, as to those who say: ‘Feeling is definitely not my self. My self does not experience feeling.’ You should say this to them, ‘But reverend, where there is nothing felt at all, would the thought “I am” occur there?’”

“No, sir.”

“That’s why it’s not acceptable to regard self as that which does not experience feeling.

Now, as to those who say: ‘Feeling is definitely not my self. But it’s not that my self does not experience feeling. My self feels, for my self is liable to feel.’ You should say this to them, ‘Suppose feelings were to totally and utterly cease without anything left over. When there’s no feeling at all, with the cessation of feeling, would the thought “I am this” occur there?’”

“No, sir.”

“That’s why it’s not acceptable to regard self as that which is liable to feel.

Not regarding anything in this way, they don’t grasp at anything in the world. Not grasping, they’re not anxious. Not being anxious, they personally become extinguished. They understand: ‘Rebirth is ended, the spiritual journey has been completed, what had to be done has been done, there is no return to any state of existence.’

It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant whose mind is freed like this holds the following views: ‘A Realized One exists after death’; ‘A Realized One doesn’t exist after death’; ‘A Realized One both exists and doesn’t exist after death’; ‘A Realized One neither exists nor doesn’t exist after death’.

Why is that? A mendicant is freed by directly knowing this: how far language and the scope of language extend; how far terminology and the scope of terminology extend; how far description and the scope of description extend; how far wisdom and the sphere of wisdom extend; how far the cycle of rebirths and its continuation extend. It wouldn’t be appropriate to say that a mendicant freed by directly knowing this holds the view: ‘There is no such thing as knowing and seeing.’